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Chapter 6

Private Pension Systems in Transition
Economies
John A. Turner and David M. Rajnes

In many countries around the world, a debate is occurring over the
structure of retirement income systems. Following the downfall of communism, countries in central and eastern Europe are considering private
pensions to complement their state-run social security systems. In these
countries and elsewhere, the state social security retirement income systems face severe financial problems caused by benefits that are overly
generous and entitlement rules that allow eligibility at too young an age.
In response to the heavy burden on government, private pension systems
are seen as reducing the government spending needed to support an
increasingly elderly society.
Establishing private pension systems in countries where they have not
existed has proven to be difficult. Major institutional changes needed to
establish private pension systems may be dependent on other financial
institutions' being developed first.
This chapter provides analysis and a new perspective on issues surrounding the development of private pension systems. Recognizing that
there are major differences between countries, the chapter considers
within a general framework the initial steps toward establishing private
pension systems. The development ofa private pension system also needs
to consider the particular situation of individual countries. This chapter
draws its examples from central and eastern Europe, but much of the
analysis is applicable for other countries.
Private pension systems, once established, tend to evolve as an experienced group of professionals develops to manage them, and as changing
economic and demographic conditions warrant. Features of a new private pension system that are appropriate at the beginning stages may
need to be changed later as conditions change.
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In considering the development of private pension systems, two primary questions arise. First, what are the necessary preconditions before a
private pension system can established? Alternatively, what is the necessary sequence in which legal, economic, and institutional developments
need to occur? Second, what form should new private pension systems
take?
Because of the close connection between social security and pension
systems, social security retirement income reform must be addressed at
the same time as private pension reform. Such reform may involve raising
the minimum retirement age, eliminating special categories of beneficiaries, reducing real benefit levels, changing the benefit formula to tie
benefits more closely to earnings, or alternatively moving to a flat benefit
where all beneficiaries receive the same amount. l The complex issues of
social security reform are not considered here.

Preconditions for Establishing Private Pension Systems
The private pension systems of North America, western Europe, and
Japan are supported by complex legal, financial, and service provider systems. These support systems involve sophisticated institutional arrangements and highly trained specialists. These support systems appear to be
prerequisites for the pension systems they support.
Factors necessary for establishing private pensions can be identified by
studying the historical development of private pensions in other countries. Historical experience concerning the pension systems in other
countries provides insights on ways to deal with problems arising due to
the limitations of existing economic and institutional conditions.

Economic Preconditions
Capital Markets
The countries of central and eastern Europe, like many countries without private pension systems, do not have well-developed capital markets.
At best, they have fledgling stock markets with few securities traded, and
few regulatory safeguards found in Western countries' capital markets.
Because of government subsidies of businesses and the financial instability in the economies, it is difficult for capital markets to determine
accurate, stable values for financial assets and for firms.
For small countries with a limited industrial base, optimally diversified
pension portfolios would have a relatively small percentage invested domestically. This pattern of pension investment is seen in another small
country, the Republic ofIreland, which in the mid-I990s had a popula-
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tion of 3.5 million and which had pension plans with larger amounts
invested in foreign equities than in domestic equities. However, the countries of central and eastern Europe do not have sufficient foreign currency to invest in foreign securities. Investment of pension funds abroad
under new private pension laws in Hungary (1993) and the Czech Republic (1994) is exceedingly difficulLlt is virtually impossible under the
Hungarian foreign exchange regulations, while very difficult in practice
under current Czech exchange restrictions (Batty, Stumpa, and Kovari
1994) .
Alternative portfolio diversification options that limit domestic exposure could include investment in multinational subsidiaries, internationaljoint venture firms, and export-oriented enterprises. The lack of
domestic financial instruments and assets in which to invest and the
inability to invest in foreign markets create problems for the development offunded pension systems.
The historical experience of Chile,Japan, and Germany, however, suggests that having a developed financial market is not necessarily a precondition for developing a private pension system. Chile in 1981 established
a fully funded mandatory defined contribution system to replace its public defined benefit social security system. At that time, Chile had few
financial assets in which its pensions plans could invest and it did not
permit international investments. During the early years, private pension
funds were invested almost entirely in government bonds, and subsequent demand for financial securities by Chilean pension funds encouraged development of a successful stock marketY
In both Japan and Germany after World War II, the banking sector and
financial markets were destroyed. Nonetheless, private pensions were
developed using the book reserve method of financing (Ahrend, Chapter 3, this volume, and Watanabe, Chapter 4, this volume). With this
method, funds that might have been invested outside the firm are instead
retained within the firm. A liability for the promised future pension
benefits is then reported on the financial accounts of the firm.
Investing the pension fund entirely in the sponsoring firm entails high
risk, especially in an uncertain economic environment. In Germany, this
liability must be insured. Without insurance, workers may bear considerable risk because of the uncertainty surrounding the financial future of
many enterprises.
Pension funds in countries developing new pension systems could invest in government bonds, as in Chile, or finance their pensions through
book reserve financing, as in Japan and Germany. They could also invest
in former state enterprises now being privatized. In Chile in the mid1980s, stock in state enterprises was offered for sale on the Santiago Stock
Exchange. Initially, only the large pension funds were permitted to buy it.
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Chilean economists felt that only the large pension funds had sufficient
financial expertise to evaluate the stocks and determine a realistic price.
Privatization - the transfer of state property to private ownershippresents unique opportunities for the development of private pensions.
Significant progress has been made almost everywhere in central and
eastern Europe in privatizing small firms, although privatizing larger
enterprises has proceeded more slowly (Slay 1993).
Besides directly purchasing stock, pension funds could invest in newly
privatized enterprises through mutual funds or investment funds. Such
investment funds would be able to assist people in investing privatization
vouchers that they had received (either distributed freely or purchased).
Instead of themselves selecting a firm or firms in which to invest, people
could exchange their vouchers against the shares of these specialized
financial institutions, which would invest the public's vouchers for them.
Such a system provides investment diversification, as funds would invest
in dozens of companies. In effect, the government creates shares in enterprises that it wishes to privatize, selling or giving those shares to individuals or mutual funds. In this way, pension funds could also buy or be
granted mutual fund shares.
Privatization through the distribution of free vouchers has occurred in
the former Czechoslovakia, and continued in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the shares of privatized
firms are held by large Investment Privatization Funds. Individuals own
shares in these funds through their vouchers (International Monetary
Fund 1994). Such funds have been proposed in Poland. One of the most
extensive programs so far is in Russia, where the government has encouraged capitalism by giving away most state property, issuing 144 million
vouchers free to citizens.
Pension funds can play an important role in privatizing an economy, as
they did in Chile, because of their financial expertise and because their
funds create a demand for a financial market (James and Vittas, Chapter
5, this volume). Thus, rather than arguing that capital markets must
precede the development of private pension funds, this approach suggests that pension funds will create a demand for capital markets. Conversely, the prevalence of book reserve financing by German pension
funds, which can be used in the absence of well-developed capital markets, may explain the relatively small stock market in that country.

Inflation
In many central and eastern European countries, inflation during the
early years of the economic transition was high and variable. In some
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countries, this problem has declined considerably. For example, Poland's
annual inflation rate was 251 percent in 1989,586 percent in 1990,70
percent in 1991,43 percent in 1992, 35 percent in 1993, and estimated
to be 27 percent in 1994 (International Monetary Fund 1994). High
and unpredictable inflation rates create uncertainty for both firms and
savers. This environment penalizes savers when interest rates do not reflect an inflation premium (as in those administratively set).
If inflation is not to destroy a funded pension system, such a system
must invest in assets that preserve their value in an inflationary market.
Generally, equities preserve their value in an inflationary environment,
provided the tax system does not cause the relative tax burden on equities
to increase with inflation.
Alternatively, as was done in Chile, the government could offer inflation-indexed bonds. That was facilitated by the Chilean government's
inflation-indexing the tax system and other aspects of the economy. Although inflation-indexed bonds have desirable features, few governments offer them. Further, in the United Kingdom where they have been
offered, few pension plans have used them, presumably because the liabilities for active workers are generally effectively indexed by wages rather
than prices.

Interest Rates
As well as determining the value of assets, capital markets determine the
present value of liabilities for benefit payments due in the future. In
countries where interest rates are not determined by the market but are
administratively set, problems can arise. The combination of administered interest rates and decontrolled prices with widely fluctuating inflation rates can lead to wide fluctuations in real interest rates (Korczyk
1993). During 1990, for example, the real interest rate on low risk lending in Poland ranged from +75 percent during the low inflation early
part of the year to about - 300 percent during the high - inflation latter
part of the year (OECD 1992). In such a situation, it is difficult to determine stable economic values for assets and liabilities because marketbased valuations vary considerably.

Real Income
Real income in the central and eastern European countries declined
during the early part of the transition phase from communism to a market economy. During a period of declining real income, workers are
unlikely to save for future consumption. Rather, in an attempt to main-
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tain their former level of consumption, they will dissave. Thus, a period of
declining real income is not a good time to start a mandatory funded
pension system, but a voluntary system could be launched.

Institutional Preconditions
As well as economic preconditions for the development of private pensions, several institutional preconditions may need to be established.

Social Security
In many central and eastern European countries, social security reform
is urgently needed because of the high costs of the existing systems. The
seriousness of that problem suggests to some analysts that social security
reform should be the top priority in the retirement income area; thereafter, private pension reform would be considered. However, reductions in
real social security benefits and postponement of age of eligibility will
be more easily achieved if a private pension alternative is available to
workers (Fox 1994).

The Legal System
Many of the countries of central and eastern Europe do not have legal
systems that clearly protect individual property rights and that establish
legal rights in bankruptcy. It has been argued that laws governing prudence, self-dealing, and other aspects of fiduciary behavior, and concerning settlement of property disputes and bankruptcies are necessary prerequisites to developing of a funded private pension system (Korczyk
1993). These protections need to be established to reduce financial risks,
and until they are, uncertainty about prospective changes in the legal
system add to the uncertainties facing individuals and firms.

Regulation
Because of the money that accumulates in pension plans, these funds
may be the target of theft and fraud. To prevent financial malfeasance
from jeopardizing the retirement income of many people and shaking
public confidence in a newly established private pension system, financial
safeguards must be established at an early stage.
Pension fund regulators in Western countries rely on other regulators,
such as those governing investment markets and financial institutions. In
most central and eastern European countries, the regulation of banks,
stocks and bonds, and insurance markets is in its early stages.
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The Chilean experience, however, demonstrates that pension reform
can be started without having a sound regulatory structure in place (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994). Modern bank regulation was not fully
operational in that nation until 1982, a year after the pension reform
had been implemented. Reforms to the securities and corporation laws
were passed in 1981. Later during the 1980s and 1990s, financial reform
occurred several times, in part in response to the growth of pension
funds.

Trained Personnel
The sophisticated private pension systems found in the United States,Japan, and other developed countries depend on the services of actuaries,
accountants and auditors, financial management experts, attorneys, and
computer specialists. Decentralized fund management requires more
trained personnel than centralized fund management. While decentralized fund management may be more efficient than centralized management in developed countries (Davis, Chapter 8, this volume), that only
applies in economies with an ample supply of trained personnel. Countries developing a new pension system can economize on skilled personnel by initially limiting the number of alternatives for fund management.
Foreign expertise can also substitute for the lack of domestic expertise
while domestic expertise is being developed. The Hungarian-American
Enterprise Fund provides an example, where Western experts initially
were used to evaluate the pl'Ojects the fund invested in.

Policy Options
In considering policy options, any proposal for a private pension system
should:
•
•
•
•

Reduce the fiscal burden on the government,
Protect the security of retirement benefits,
Maintain regulatory simplicity, and
Be politically acceptable.

Any proposal that is not politically sustainable is ultimately self-defeating. While this chapter does not directly analyze the political acceptability of proposals, all the proposals it considers are policies that have
been implemented in other countries, and thus have met the test of
political acceptability at least in the context of one country.
This section draws on the experience of a number of countries in
considering specific proposals for dealing with problems that arise in
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developing private pension systems. It concludes with a timetable suggesting an ordering of policy developments.

Financing the Transition
The transition from a retirement income system with only a pay-as-you-go
social security system to a system where social security has a reduced role
and there is a funded private pension system is generally difficult because
ofthe paying twice problem. The "paying twice" problem is the situation
facing the transitional working generation that must set aside savings to
fund its own future benefits, while at the same time paying for the existing social security system, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The double payment burden of the transition can be eased. First, if the
new system is phased in gradually, the burden is spread over a longer time
period and thus over more tax-paying cohorts.
Second, an abrupt transition from a pay-as-you-go social security system to a funded private pension system could be financed, as was done in
Chile, by the issuance of government bonds. Workers having past service
credits in the old social security system were issued these bonds to compensate them for their past service credits. The bonds are interest-bearing but no payments can be made until the worker reaches retirement.
The bonds are financed out of general revenues. By postponing the
payments, the Chilean government has been able to spread out the cash
payments required to finance the transition to its funded pension system
(Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994).
Third, in Chile the transition was also financed by a surplus in the
government's general revenues. The Chilean government, in anticipation of costs of transition from a pay-as-you-go to a funded retirement
income system, purposively accumulated a government surplus in its general revenues. For most countries, this is not a feasible option. An alternative to that approach is to build up a surplus in the social security trust
funds. While these approaches are available to some countries, neither
are available to the countries of central and eastern Europe because of
the financial strains on their government budgets and social security
funds.
Fourth, revenues from government-owned assets or proceeds from
. their sale can be used to finance the government's past-service pension
obligations (Jenkins 1992). Argentina in 1994 helped finance the transition to a partially privatized system by the sale of government-owned
enterprises.
Normally the establishment of funded pension plans that provide
meaningful benefits takes decades because of the large sums that must be
accumulated to pay benefits over a worker's retirement years. The assets
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of socialized enterprises, however, can be used to make up for the lack of
initial assets in the pension funds (Holzmann 1993; Hanke 1991).
Fifth, in addition to government policies to ease the transition, supporting changes may occur in the private sector. To the extent that generations are connected by in tergenerational transfers, the shift in assets
between generations that occurs during the transition to a partially privatized system can be offset by private intergenerational transfers. The
transition generation can adjust by making fewer private intergenerational transfers, and other generations can increase their transfers to the
transition generation. To the extent that generations are linked by private intergenerational transfers, such adjustments may naturally occur.

Financial Incentives
In a market economy, the primary force driving economic development
is financial incentive. In all countries with well-<ieveloped private pension
systems, a major factor in the development of those systems has been tax
incentives.
Personal income tax systems are envisaged in all countries of central
and eastern Europe. They have already been implemented in Hungary
(1988) and Poland (1992), and by the Czech Republic (1993) and Slovakia (1993). Tax incentives for pensions are generally provided through
the tax exemption of contributions and investment returns of the pension funds. The taxation of pension plans generally takes the form of
taxation of benefits (Dilnot, Chapter 6, this volume). The 1993 Hungarian private pension law takes this form. In an in teresting variation to
this approach, the Czech Republic provides matching funds to encourage pension growth.
Postponing taxation of pensions until benefits are received reduces the
short-run cash flow for the government. In the transition economies,
which are facing governmental cash flow problems, deferral of tax payments may pose a problem for the governments.
Alternatively stated, the deferral until retirement of taxes on pensions
implies a loan by the public sector to the private sector, thereby enlarging
the fiscal deficit. The loan is equivalent to the taxes that would have
otherwise been paid but that are, in effect, given back to the worker in
exchange for their repayment at retirement. At the same time, private
individuals need to save more in order to meet their future income tax
payments on their pension benefits while maintaining their after-tax pension benefits. Therefore, if private sector workers anticipate future tax
payments, private pension saving and other saving should in effect compensate for part of the public dissaving (Holzmann 1993). However, the
populations in central and eastern Europe, because of the expectation of
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rising incomes, wish to consume more now than their current income
permits but are prevented from doing so because of the difficulty of
borrowing against expected future income. In light of this liquidity constraint, it seems unlikely that the private sector will compensate for
potential public dissaving. Thus, the phasing in of private pensions supported by tax incentives may initially decrease rather than increase national savings. In the early phases of the transition, the introduction of
tax incentives for pensions may be too expensive for government budgets. However, the effect of not introducing tax incentives is that the private pension system will be an unimportant source of retirement income.
Social Security

The generosity of social security benefits limits the development of private pension plans. This occurs particularly if benefits are generous
for individuals at higher income levels (Davis, Chapter 8, this volume).
Therefore, a first step toward developing private pensions is to limit social
security benefits at higher income levels. This could be done by not
providing cost ofliving adjustments in retirement for social security benefits above a certain level, as was done in Hungary. It could also be done,
as in Ireland, by providing a flat social security benefit to all workers.

A Decentralized Competitive System for Pension
Asset Management
In a decentrally managed competitive system for pension asset manage'ment, workers and firms pick their own management company from a
number of management companies. They can transfer their accounts
from one management company to another. Decentralized management
systems are less vulnerable to pressure to invest pension funds for political reasons than are government-run centrally managed systems (James
and Vi ttas , Chapter 5, this volume).
The governments of central and eastern Europe currently do not have
personnel with the requisite training for regulating pension funds and
financial markets. For this reason, the transition economy countries
should probably have their newly established pension funds managed by
large financial management firms controlling the assets of numerous
individual pension fund accounts, as is done in Chile. With this structure
for managing pension funds, regulatory authorities only have a few large
entities to oversee.
THis is the thinking of the Czech government, which is stressing a small
number of large funds that can easily be supervised. That approach is
quite different from the Hungarian approach, where there is a desire
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to establish a significant number of Voluntary Mutual Benefit Funds
(VMBFs) for the employees of individual companies. But even in the
Hungarian approach, employer-specific plans are not the sole method
available. Funds can be established on a regional, occupational, or trade
basis (Batty, Stumpa, and Kovari et al. 1994).

Chilean Pension Portfolio Regulations
Two approaches can be used to regulate private pension investments.
The first approach, used by the United States and the United Kingdom, is
the "prudent man rule." This approach places few specific restrictions
on allowable investments. Instead, pension plan managers are required
to diversifY their asset holdings and in all other respects to invest plan
assets consistently with what would be done by a prudent person acting in
such circumstances. Failure to perform carries civil and possibly criminal
penalties.
The second approach places specific maximum and possibly minimum
restrictions on the percentage of a pension portfolio that may be invested
in certain types of assets. This approach is used by Chile,Japan, and many
other countries. The second approach gives plans less flexibility in deciding their investments. It is, however, a simpler approach for regulators to
monitor and for that reason may be preferable.
Hungarian pension law follows this second approach. It lays down
strict provisions as to the proportions that can be invested in four classes
ofassets rated by risk factor (Batty, Stumpa, and Kovari et al. 1994). Czech
restrictions, by contrast, do not limit types of investments but focus on
the permissible investments in a particular company or particular share
issue.

British-Style Voluntary Personal Pension Plans
An early step toward developing pension institutions and capital markets
is to allow voluntary tax-deductible personal pension plans. To limit the
tax revenue lost, a restriction should be placed on tax-deductible contributions, such as 15 percent of earnings up to a fixed ceiling amount, with
a flat minimum amount that exceeded 15 percent of earnings for low
earners. These pensions are simple to administer and do not impede
labor mobili ry.
An alternative would be to allow such pensions in conjunction with
partial contracting out, as is done in the United Kingdom (Daykin, Chapter 2, this volume). For example, workers could reduce their social security tax payments by a small amount if they contributed to a personal
pension. Administratively, this could be handled by the employee's re-
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questing that at the end of the tax year that amount be transferred to his
or her personal pension account.

A Voluntary or a Compulsory System
An option for developing a private pension system involves establishing a
universal mandatory savings system as a second tier in the retirement
income system. This savings plan would supplement or replace a traditional defined benefit social security system (Fox 1994). The savings plan
would be similar to that found in Chile. France, Switzerland, Australia,
and Sweden also have compulsory national private funded pension systems. At least 20 countries have compulsory provident funds, or forced
savings funds (james and Vittas, Chapter 5, this volume). The two private
systems currently operating in the central and east European regionCzech and Hungarian-are both voluntary. A voluntary system is politically appealing to some people because it provides freedom of choice.
A mandatory funded pension system or a mandatory provident fund
system would accumulate a large amount of funds. That would strain the
financial and regulatory systems of those countries. At the same time, the
potential for dynamic interaction between rapidly accumulating pension
funds and the financial sector should not be overlooked.

Contracting Out by Employers Meeting Japanese Criteria
BothJapan and the United Kingdom allow employers to contract out of
the social security system. In these countries, employers and employees
can reduce their social security tax payments, and in exchange, the employer provides a private pension plan that meets certain requirements.
While all employers and all employees in the United Kingdom are permitted to contract out, inJapan only large employers or groups of employers
may do so, provided that they meet profitability and other requirements.
The Japanese approach to contracting out could be adopted. For example, employers of 5,000 or more employees would be eligible if they had
growing or stable workforces for the previous three years and had earned
a profit for the previous three years. These employers could then reduce
their social security payroll tax payments. Such a system would only be
available to economically stable firms, but it would allow a small reduction
in -the total size of the social security system.

German Vesting Rules
Defined benefit plans are generally not portable, meaning that workers
who change jobs receive lower benefits than do workers who stay with one
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employer. Lack of portability may create a barrier to efficient labor market adjustment. During the economic transition, many workers need to
change jobs as the economies restructure. During the transition period
the accumulated value of pension benefits, and the associated barrier to
mobility caused by their loss, would be small.
The development of employer-based defined benefit pensions creates
longterm employer liabilities. These liabilities could make it more difficult to restructure enterprises during the transition (Fox 1994). In
addition, enterprises will become bankrupt or cease to exist during the
transition, which implies that pension promises may not be kept. This
phenomenon can prompt calls for pension insurance with its attendant
dangers (Pesando, Chapter 9, this volume).
If mandatory vesting were set at 10 years, for the first few years of
participation pension plans would have little effect on labor mobility
because the date of vesting would be sufficiently far off. In Germany,
mandatory vesting occurs at 10 years of participation in a pension plan
for workers age 35 and older and 12 years for younger workers. Adoption
of this vesting rule would limit the disruption from impeded job mobility
or due to firm bankruptcy during the transition phase.

British Funding Rules
In the United Kingdom, full funding is only required in contracted-out
plans for the guaranteed minimum benefit. In a sense, book reserve
funding may be used for benefit amounts above that level. The funding
and capital market requirements of new pension plans could be eased
initially by requiring only that funding cover a minimum level of benefits
provided by defined benefit private pension plans. Workers would be
informed of the funding level of their plan and would understand that,
for unfunded benefits above the minimum level, they faced greater risks.

Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
Defined benefit and defined contribution plans have desirable features
for different types of workers and firms. The choice between them need
not be made by the government but can be left to individuals and firms.
While defined benefit plans are more complex to administer and regulate, those problems are not insurmountable. Many of the complications
of defined benefit plans are related to their providing annuities. A simplified form of defined benefit plan could be initially offered, for example one that only paid benefits for a fixed number of years.
Defined contribution plans, however, have qualities that commend
their use (Holzmann 1991). They do not require a great number of
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financial professionals nor comprehensive government regulations. S0phisticated financial markets would also be unnecessary, since defined
contribution plans could incorporate the distribution of privatized assets
through vouchers. Important to the transformation process as well is the
fact that defined contribution plans would not create impediments to
enterprise restructuring because the defined contribution plans would
be unrelated to firm liabilities. They would also not create an obstacle
to labor mobility since they would be portable. Hungarian Voluntary
Mutual Benefit Funds are expected to be predominantly defined contribution plans. The Czech law does not yet allow for defined benefit
plans.

The Chilean Model
The success of pension reform in Chile, combined perhaps with cultural
affinity, has caused that approach to appeal to other Latin American
countries. That approach has also been recommended by some pension
consultants for central and eastern Europe. In Chile, all new entrants to
the labor force, except the self-employed, must establish an individual
account pension plan to which they contribute a minimum of IO percent
of their earnings, up to a maximum level of earnings that is roughly five
times the average salary of all covered workers. The self-employed can
participate voluntarily. Participants in the old social security system have
the option of continuing in that system orjoining the new system.'
This mandatory funded defined contribution pension system replaces
the traditional defined benefit social security system in Chile. An additional contribution pays for administrative expenses, disability insurance, and pre-retirement survivors benefits. Employees wishing to contribute more to their accounts may do so. The funds must be invested
with investment management companies that have been established
solely for the purpose of managing the individual account pension plans.
These companies are regulated by the national government.
Most social security systems redistribute income toward low income
workers. The Chilean pension system also has that feature in that it guarantees a minimum pension that is funded through general revenues. To
the extent that the individual's account is insufficient to provide the
minimum, the difference is made up from general revenues.
In traditional defined benefit pension systems, the financial market
risk is borne primarily by the employer. In the Chilean pension system,
the financial risk is borne primarily by the worker. However, if the pension fund earns a rate of return substantially below that earned on average by all funds, the management company must bear some of the risk.
Larger employers are presumably better able to bear pension fund risk
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because they can pool the risks that many workers with different retirement dates would face individually.
The Chilean pension system provides less diversification than mixed
pension systems that also contain defined benefit plans and social security pay-as-you-go plans. It also provides less freedom of choice than do
other pension systems.

Pension Benefit Insurance
Most countries have not established pension benefit insurance programs.
Most countries with such programs have experienced serious problems. 4
In addition, countries with pension benefit insurance programs have
adopted regulations whose primary purpose is to protect the insurance
programs. Some of these regulations have restricted the investment options of pension plans in ways that otherwise would not need to have
been restricted (Davis, Chapter 8, this volume). There are alternative
regulatory frameworks that can be established to protect pension benefits. For example, the funding level of pension plans can be regulated to
maintain minimum funding levels. In addition, workers should be informed on a regular basis as to the funding level of their pension plan.

Begin Slowly and Have Realistic Expectations
Because the countries starting new pension systems are inexperienced in
managing private pension systems, they may make mistakes in the early
stages. For that reason, new pension systems should be developed initially
on a modest scale. They should be simple to understand, to administer,
and to regulate.
Private pension systems for central and eastern Europe have been criticized because they will cover only part of the labor force. This could increase income inequality. Voluntary private pension systems in practice
nearly always cover less than half of the labor force (Daily and Turner
1992). Private pension systems are generally designed to provide retirement income to middle and upper income workers. This fact should be realized so that unrealistic expectations as to coverage levels are not raised.

An Approach Toward Implementation
Table 1 outlines a proposal for the steps to take in developing a private
pension system. The essence of this proposal is training for government
and private sector pension professionals and incentives to private sector
individuals and firms for establishing pensions. The proposal divides the
development of a private pension system into three phases.
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TABLE I

Timetable for Establishing an Employer-Provided Private
Pension System

Phase!

Limit inflation through macroeconomic policy, deregulate interest rates
Train pension personnel-development of human capital
Draft and discuss pension reform proposals and alternatives
Establish a personal income tax system
Gradually increase social security retirement age and eliminate special categories of social securities benefits
Phase II

Establish voluntary individual pension accounts that receive preferential tax
treatment
Establish several pension management firms
Grant tax exemption for pension contributions and investment earnings
Reduce the real level of social security benefits for middle and upper income
workers
Establish the regulatory framework for pension management firms
Phase III

. Draft pension law with preferential tax treatment or subsidy for pensions

In the first phase, some preconditions are established. We assume that
a transitional economic reform plan is being implemented. This would
include macroeconomic policies to address inflationary pressures and to
promote factor and product markets, new social safety net institutions, removal of foreign exchange restrictions, and institutional and legal measures to establish property rights and allow for the privatization of state
assets. With this body of generally accepted policy prescriptions implemented, movement to study private pension alternatives, train pension
personnel, and reform the social security system should quickly follow.
In the second phase, a simplified voluntary individual pension system
is established. The monetary and financial sector reforms introduced
during the first phase allow functioning banks and insurance companies
to develop. Incentives built into the tax code for corporations and individuals are intended to stimulate economic agents to establish private
pensions in an increasingly flexible labor market.
In the third phase, a framework for an employer-provided pension
system is established. We have suggested features such a system might
include.

Conclusion
Using the experience of other countries with private pension systems as a
guid,e, as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic, small steps could be
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taken immediately in central and eastern Europe and elsewhere to start
the development of private pension systems. Taking these steps will have
a number of immediate benefits. First, they will make social security
reform easier. Second, they will aid in privatization of state enterprises.
Third, they will aid in the development of financial markets. Fourth, they
will develop an understanding and appreciation of market institutions
among the citizenry. Fifth, they will be a positive step toward greater
financial security in retirement.
This chapter is the responsibility of the authors and does not represent
the position of any institution with which they are associated. The work
on this chapter was undertaken while Turner was a Senior Fulbright
Scholar at the Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales in France.

Notes

'Tying benefits to earnings would make social security in to a mandatory savings program with no redistributive aspect. Providing a flat benefit would change
social security into a purely redistributive program with high earners contributing more but receiving the same amount as low earners.
2Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994) provide a good description of the Chilean
pension system.
'The Chilean pension system is described in Hanke (1991), Myers (1992), and
Santamaria (1992).
'See Pesando (Chapter 9, this volume), Weaver (Chapter 9, this volume), and
Turner (1993) concerning the Vnited States.
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